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A B S T R A C T
The componential view of human emotion recognises that affective states comprise conscious, behavioural,
physiological, neural and cognitive elements. Although many animals display bodily and behavioural changes
consistent with the occurrence of affective states similar to those seen in humans, the question of whether and in
which species these are accompanied by conscious experiences remains controversial. Finding scientifically valid
methods for investigating markers for the subjective component of affect in both humans and animals is central
to developing a comparative understanding of the processes and mechanisms of affect and its evolution and
distribution across taxonomic groups, to our understanding of animal welfare, and to the development of animal
models of affective disorders. Here, contemporary evidence indicating potential markers of conscious processing
in animals is reviewed, with a view to extending this search to include markers of conscious affective processing.
We do this by combining animal-focused approaches with investigations of the components of conscious and
non-conscious emotional processing in humans, and neuropsychological research into the structure and func-
tions of conscious emotions.
1. Introduction
For humans, emotions are quintessentially about feelings: con-
sciously experienced, subjectively focused, reportable, affective states.
Measuring these states seems easy enough; all we need to do is ask. On
closer inspection, complications arise: Different methodologies and
questionnaires may tap different facets of felt emotion or affect, and
there may not always be perfect correspondence between their findings.
Some people will be poor at recognising or articulating their emotions,
while others will lie about how they actually feel. And when emotion
reports have a retrospective component, they can be subject to con-
structive biases of memory (Redelmeier and Kahneman, 1996). But,
ultimately, the gold standard of subjective emotion measurement in
healthy adult humans remains linguistic report (Barrett, 2006a; Bradley
and Lang, 2000; LeDoux, 2014a, LeDoux and Hoffmann, 2018; Oatley
and Jenkins, 1996). Unfortunately, this state of affairs leaves a major
problem for anyone interested in conscious emotional or affective states
in non-human animals, because animals cannot tell us how they feel. In
fact, the problem is twofold. First, we do not know for sure which
species have the capacity for consciousness of any kind, emotional or
other (e.g. Dawkins, 2000, 2001, 2017; LeDoux, 1996; Macphail, 1998;
Rolls, 1999, 2005, 2007; although see Panksepp, 1994, 2005; and
Wemelsfelder, 2001, for alternative views). And second, for those spe-
cies with a capacity for consciousness, we do not have methods for
establishing whether and what sorts of conscious emotions they ex-
perience.
These problems are relevant to almost all scientists studying non-
human affect. The expanding field of affective neuroscience relies
heavily on comparative studies of emotion or emotion-like states in
both humans and animals (e.g. Alcaro et al., 2007; Berridge, 2000;
Buchel and Dolan, 2000; Lang et al., 2000; LeDoux, 2000; Phelps and
LeDoux, 2005). Much animal-based research in psychopharmacology
makes use of parallels between the emotional systems of humans and
other species (e.g. Frazer and Morilak, 2005; Haug and Whalen, 1999;
Pawlak et al., 2008). But we cannot make confident comparisons be-
tween humans and animals in the critical domain of conscious affect.
For example, when pharmacological interventions have parallel effects
on aspects of human and animal behaviour, it is reasonable to suppose,
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but difficult to decisively demonstrate, that they have similar effects on
feelings or conscious experiences (e.g. Kregiel et al., 2016; Vera-Chang
et al., 2018). Animal welfare researchers face a similar problem. The
evaluation of interventions to improve the well-being of animals is
limited by our capacity to identify the character, or even the existence,
of their conscious affective states (Dawkins, 2017; Mendl and Paul,
2004).
Traditionally, the topic of conscious affect in animals has been re-
garded as all but taboo, with the possibility of conscious processes in
animals having long been seen as fundamentally inaccessible to em-
pirical investigation (e.g. LeDoux, 1996; Skinner, 1953). But in recent
years there has been a rapid expansion of the fields of comparative
emotion and affective neuroscience (e.g. see Anderson and Adolphs,
2014; de Waal, 2011; Mendl et al., 2010; Paul et al., 2005), and over a
similar period, there has been an equally dramatic rise in research into
the neuroscience of consciousness (e.g., Dehaene, 2014; Koch et al.,
2016). Together and in turn, these developments have prompted some
early signs of serious academic interest in the study of conscious affect
and its evolutionary antecedents, with a number of recently published
papers considering this difficult issue directly (Berridge, 2018; LeDoux
and Hofmann, 2018Paul and Mendl, 2018; Smith and Lane, 2015,
2016). In the present review, we focus on the methodological and
theoretical issues emerging from studies of human consciousness and
human emotion which are directly pertinent to investigations of con-
scious affective processes in animals.
In Section 2, we start with a brief discussion of emotion terminol-
ogies in the context of humans and non-human animals (hereafter an-
imals). In Section 3, we highlight the utility of the componential view of
emotions – as multifaceted states comprising behavioural, physiolo-
gical, cognitive and conscious components – in advancing animal
emotion research in general, and research into conscious emotion in
particular (e.g. Bradley and Lang, 2000; Clore and Ortony, 2000; Lang,
1993; LeDoux, 1996; Scherer, 1984). Section 4 sets the scene for de-
veloping comparative investigations of conscious emotion by briefly
outlining the neural and information processing correlates of human
consciousness, and discussing how these may be translated to animals.
In Section 5, we narrow our focus to conscious emotion and review
research and theory regarding its structure, highlighting possible si-
milarities and differences between affective conscious experiences in
humans and non-human animals. In Sections 6 and 7 we consider po-
tential markers for conscious emotion, focusing on the search for its
neural and cognitive correlates, and considering the ways in which this
search could be applied.
Our aim is not to offer premature answers to questions about the
distribution and character of nonhuman emotional experience. Instead,
our goal is to gauge our current state of understanding of affect in
humans and animals, to clarify the types of information that are needed
to develop a new, comparative science of conscious emotion (Berridge,
2018; LeDoux and Hofmann, 2018; Paul and Mendl, 2018), and to il-
lustrate the principles and potential pitfalls of this endeavour.
2. Terminology: emotion, affect, and feelings in humans and
animals
Although extensively studied in humans, a universal definition of
emotions is still contentious. In the 1980s, Fehr and Russell (1984, p.
464) wrote that “Everyone knows what an emotion is, until asked to
give a definition. Then, it seems, no one knows.” Kleinginna and
Kleinginna (1981) considered 92 definitions and 9 sceptical descrip-
tions produced by scientists in the field, illustrating the lack of con-
sensus that underlies the concept of emotion and its usefulness in the
scientific framework. Having said this, most human researchers accept
some version of the componential view of emotion (as elaborated in
Section 3), in which it is defined as a state characterized by loosely
coordinated changes in the following five components: (i) fee-
ling—–changes in subjective experience, (ii) cognition—–changes in
attentional, perceptual, and inferential processes (appraisals), (iii) ac-
tion—–changes in the predisposition for or execution of specific re-
sponses, (iv) expression—–changes in facial, vocal, postural appear-
ance, and (v) physiology—–changes in physiological and neural
activity.
The use of terms and definitions in the context of animal emotions
has long been a matter of confusion and controversy (e.g. see Duffy,
1934; Mandler, 1975). Whether words such as “emotion”, “fear”,
“sadness” or “joy” should ever be used when talking about animals has
been extensively debated (e.g. see Berridge, 2018; Damasio, 1999;
Davidson, 2003; LeDoux, 1996, 2014a; LeDoux and Hofmann, 2018;
Winkielman and Berridge, 2004). LeDoux (1996, 2012, 2014a, LeDoux
and Brown, 2017; LeDoux and Hofmann, 2018) has suggested that the
words “emotion” and “fear” by themselves imply human-like conscious
or phenomenal states and inner experiences, and proposes instead that
terms such as “emotional processing” and “survival circuits” should be
used with regard to animals. Damasio (1994) used the phrase “primary
emotions” to refer to the automatic emotional processes in animals and
humans that are not necessarily conscious, and “feelings” to refer to
those that are. Berridge and colleagues (Berridge, 2000; Berridge et al.,
2009; Winkielman and Berridge, 2004) have used quotation marks
around the terms “liking” and “wanting” to highlight agnosticism re-
garding the presence or absence of conscious experience of these states
in experimental animals.
We take the view that, in the absence of an entirely new nomen-
clature, “emotion” in its broadest sense, remains convenient to use as an
umbrella term when referring to the whole variety of observed aspects
of emotional or emotion-like processing in a range of species, whether
consciously experienced or not (e.g. see also Berridge, 2018; Berridge
and Winkielman, 2003; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005; de Waal, 2011).
Thus, we are happy to use “animal emotion” to refer to this area of
study. But many authors have opted for expressions such as “emotion-
like”, “anxiety-like” and “fear-like” to refer to specific states in animals
that bear behavioural and/or physiological resemblance to human
emotions, yet may or may not be conscious (e.g. Perry et al., 2016), and
we also adopt this convention here.
We also note that the terms “affect” and “affective state” are used
widely in the animal literature. In human psychology, the word “affect”
often refers to felt states that are valenced (consciously experienced as
pleasant or unpleasant, positive or negative). These include emotions
and the valenced components of sensations such as pain (i.e. the af-
fective as opposed to sensory component of pain; Hofbauer et al.,
2001). Accordingly, we similarly use “affect” to refer to valenced states
in animals (often associated with approach/withdrawal, or reward/
punishment), without implying that such states are necessarily con-
sciously experienced. Note that emotions, with their quick onset,
shorter duration, and a specific target, can also be distinguished from
slow-onset, long-duration, diffused affective states like moods. As such,
the term “affect” is useful in that it underpins both constructs, in hu-
mans and animals alike (e.g. Frijda, 2009; Mendl et al., 2010; Scherer,
2005a,b).
Finally, in human research, the terms “conscious emotion” and
“subjective emotion” tend to be used synonymously, although “sub-
jective emotion” is probably the more popular usage (e.g. Loewenstein
et al., 2001; Pham, 1998; Schwarz and Clore, 1988). A restrictive de-
finition of a subjective emotion is one in which an individual is not only
experiencing an emotion consciously, but is also aware that they are the
subject of that feeling – “I am happy”; “I feel depressed”. That is, it
combines a notion of self-awareness with one of conscious experience.
The idea of a conscious emotion, on the other hand, is somewhat looser,
potentially indicating nothing more than a raw feeling without any
accompanying sense of selfhood. In the present paper, therefore, we use
the terms “conscious affect”, “conscious emotion”, and “feeling” when
considering the possibility of consciously experienced emotional feeling
occurring in animals, to avoid the implication that such a state ne-
cessarily involves conscious self-awareness.
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3. The componential structure of emotion: conscious feelings as
one component of emotional states
Emotions can be seen as complex, multifaceted events or processes
incorporating a range of components that are expressed in a variety of
ways: Consciously (or verbally – Bradley and Lang, 2000), neurally,
physiologically, behaviourally, cognitively, and expressively (e.g.
Bradley and Lang, 2000; Clore and Ortony, 2000; Frijda, 1986; Lang,
1993; Panksepp, 2003; Smith and Lane, 2015). Within this compo-
nential view (Scherer, 1984), the reportable, conscious component of
emotion is the one that is often regarded as its central, even defining
feature, starting from William James (James, 1884; Lieberman, 2019;
Robinson and Clore, 2002). But it is also just one of many measurable
facets (Berridge and Winkielman, 2003; Davidson, 2003). For example,
in humans, emotions such as fear or anxiety involve changes in heart
rate, heightened sympathetic nervous system activation, alterations of
attention (e.g. toward threatening stimuli), subjective feelings of terror
or dread, changes in voice and posture and increased behavioural
tendencies to freeze or run away (e.g. Lang et al., 2000; LeDoux, 2003).
These facets can also be thought of in functional, as well as in
measurement terms. They often act concurrently, collectively, and co-
herently within specific emotional episodes. But they can also operate
independently, or partially independently, guiding types or modalities
of response to emotion-eliciting stimuli. For example, the specific
function of the elevated heart and respiration rate that occur during an
episode of “fear” is to increase the supply of oxygenated blood to the
peripheral musculature for the purposes of running away (Gray, 1994).
Likewise, the specific function of opening the eyes wide in a fearful
facial expression may be to enhance peripheral visual perception for the
purposes of identifying and locating the source of threat (Susskind
et al., 2008), with secondary functions related to social communication
(Lee et al., 2013). Together, the overarching function of the coordinated
changes in the components of the emotion labelled “fear” enables an
individual to successfully avoid or escape from threat. So, the compo-
nential view of emotion encapsulates the idea that not only can the
different facets of any one emotional response be measured in many
different ways, but that they can also have a number of different
functions, or sub-functions, within the wider emotional event (e.g.
Blair, 2003).
The componential view of emotion allows investigation of animal
emotions by measuring behavioural, physiological, neural and cogni-
tive components without the need to first decide whether or not a
conscious component exists in the species concerned. This has paved
the way for rapid expansion of research into affective processes in an-
imals (for reviews see: Anderson and Adolphs, 2014; Berridge, 2003;
Bliss-Moreau, 2017; deWaal, 2011; Gygax, 2017; LeDoux and Hoffman,
2018; Mendl et al., 2010; Paul et al., 2005; Paul and Mendl, 2018;
Panksepp, 2005). By thinking of the conscious component of emotions
as separable, at least in part, from other components, we are also able to
approach the study of conscious emotions from a functional perspec-
tive: what is it that an emotion does and, in particular, which of these
functions may require a conscious component in particular? This opens
up the possibility of investigating not only the neural markers or cor-
relates of conscious emotional states, but also their functional correlates
(i.e. their consequences or outcomes for the individual; e.g. see
Tamietto and de Gelder, 2010; Celeghin et al., 2017; Diano et al., 2017;
Mitchell and Greening, 2012).
In the next section we review literature pertaining to the neural
correlates of general capacity for conscious experience in humans
(NCCs) and consider the implications of existing (and competing) the-
ories of conscious processing for our understanding of animal con-
sciousness.
4. Neural correlates of consciousness
Research regarding the neural underpinnings of consciousness in
humans has proliferated in recent decades, with significant develop-
ments occurring in studies of both the correlates of the contents of
consciousness (e.g. correlates of conscious vs. non-conscious visual
word processing; Dehaene et al., 2001) and correlates of full or state
consciousness (e.g. correlates of dreaming vs dreamless sleep, or of
conscious emergence from a vegetative state; Koch et al., 2016;
Rosanova et al., 2012; Siclari et al., 2017). This rapidly expanding field
has identified a range of potential markers of consciousness which may
prove to be important in future comparative explorations of conscious
experience in animals. A number of recent reviews consider the evi-
dence for and against capacities for consciousness (of any kind) in a
range of non-human species (e.g. Boly et al., 2013; Edelman et al.,
2005; Edelman and Seth, 2009; Seth et al., 2005; Fabbro et al., 2015),
and we do not canvass that evidence in detail here. Instead, we provide
a brief overview of current findings with a view to using these to de-
velop investigations of neural and functional correlates of conscious
emotion across species.
But we begin with a note of caution. While the neuroscience of
consciousness has garnered growing interest, it has also confronted
serious methodological problems which have not been fully resolved.
Typical studies employ some variant of the “contrastive method,”
(Baars, 1997) in which neural activity is compared during conscious vs.
non-conscious processing of similar stimuli. This method rests on two
fundamental assumptions. First, the researcher must be able to reliably
distinguish conscious vs. non-conscious forms of processing. However,
even when simple stimuli are presented to healthy human adults, the
identification or exclusion of consciousness can be far from trivial (e.g.,
in characterizing the nature of consciousness beyond the focus of at-
tention; Cohen et al., 2016; Schwitzgebel, 2007), in turn generating
disputes about how to apply the contrastive method (e.g., Block, 2011;
Lamme, 2006; Dehaene et al., 2006). Second, if the presence or absence
of consciousness can be identified, the researcher must be able to dis-
tinguish brain activity directly associated with consciousness from ac-
tivity associated with prior processing which gates access to con-
sciousness (“prerequisites” or “enabling conditions”) as well as from
post-processing reflecting response preparation and other secondary
effects of conscious information (“consequences”; DeGraaf et al., 2012;
cf. Aru et al., 2012). While novel paradigms have recently been de-
veloped with the aim of separating conscious experience from its pre-
requisites and/or consequences (e.g., Boly et al., 2017; Pitts et al., 2014;
Tsuchiya et al., 2015), controversy remains about the adequacy of these
methods (e.g., Overgaard and Fazekas, 2016). In light of these core
methodological challenges, it is prudent to exercise caution in drawing
far-reaching conclusions from current findings; this is especially im-
portant to bear in mind when applications to animal welfare are con-
sidered (cf. Dawkins, 2015). Nonetheless, as research in this area ad-
vances, it is instructive to ask what candidate neuroscientific models of
consciousness would imply, and what specific questions they would
raise, about animal consciousness.
4.1. Neural substrates and information processing functions associated with
consciousness
The modern search for neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) in
humans commenced about three decades ago (Crick and Koch, 1990;
Marcel and Bisiach, 1988). Since then, a number of candidate NCCs
have been proposed. NCC theories often identify (1) an information
processing function, implemented in (2) a specific neural substrate, as
the “minimally sufficient” condition (Koch, 2004) for conscious ex-
perience. The distinction between these two components can generate
ambiguity in extending theories of human NCCs to animals, particularly
for evolutionarily distant (i.e., non-mammalian) species (e.g. see Barron
and Klein, 2016). For such species, it is possible that analogous func-
tions may be implemented in non-homologous structures. An additional
issue concerns the relationship between anatomical and functional
homologies across mammalian and other more closely related species,
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in which anatomically similar structures may actually implement quite
different cognitive functions. In light of these issues, the application of
evidence from humans to the interpretation of animals can be far from
straightforward. In particular, the implications of a particular NCC
proposal for animal consciousness may depend critically on whether
one considers the general information processing function, or the spe-
cific neural substrate (identified in human studies), to be essential for
conscious processing in other species.
As an historical example, consider Descartes’ (1649) theory of the
neurofunctional correlates of consciousness. At the functional level,
Descartes argued that unbounded human capacities for language use
and flexible generalization fall uniquely within the province of a con-
scious rational soul; at the neural level, he associated the unitary in-
tegrated character of conscious representations with the unpaired
central structure of the pineal gland. Notwithstanding the presence of
the relevant neural substrate (the pineal gland) in many animals, Des-
cartes denied that they are conscious on account of the supposed ab-
sence of the relevant information processing function (unbounded
generalization capacities). While Descartes’ account of the neural sub-
strate of consciousness has of course long been eclipsed, current the-
ories of the NCC raise similar questions of structural homology and
functional analogy.
4.1.1. Higher order theories of consciousness
Descartes’ scepticism about animal consciousness is echoed by some
(though not all) modern proponents of higher-order theories of con-
sciousness. At the functional level, these theories posit that a first-order
representation is conscious only if it is also the object of an appropriate
higher-order representation; different variants of the theory (e.g.,
higher-order thought [HOT] vs. higher-order experience [HOE] the-
ories) differ in the properties they attribute to the relevant higher-order
representations. While these theories have often been advocated on
philosophical grounds, some defences (e.g., Lau and Rosenthal, 2011)
appeal to evidence from neuroscience. These point to correlations be-
tween conscious awareness and activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (dlPFC), under conditions where task performance is matched
for conscious and nonconscious stimuli (e.g., Lau and Passingham,
2006). This dlPFC activity is assumed to be the neural substrate of late
processes of sensory metacognition involved in higher-order re-
presentation. However, the consistency and interpretation of the asso-
ciation between dlPFC activity and consciousness is a matter of con-
tinuing controversy (for contrasting perspectives, see Boly et al., 2017;
Odegaard et al., 2017).
Critics (e.g., Dretske, 1995) have often objected to higher-order
theories on the grounds that they would implausibly deny phenomenal
consciousness to many, perhaps all, animals. In defending his version of
HOT theory, Carruthers (1989,1998,2000,2005) has embraced this
conclusion, contending that phenomenal consciousness is associated
with specialized higher-order cognitive functions, is less integral to
much ordinary human behaviour than we think it is, and is likely absent
in most animals (see also Macphail, 1998). Other proponents, however,
have argued that the relevant higher-order representations need not be
as sophisticated as Carruthers and others suppose, leaving the door
open to simpler forms of higher-order representation that may be suf-
ficient for animal consciousness (Gennaro, 2004; Lau and Rosenthal,
2011). For higher-order theories of emotional consciousness specifically,
see Rolls (1999, 2004) and LeDoux and Brown (2017). For other neu-
rofunctional accounts that link consciousness with self-representation,
as well as the representation of other minds, see Humphrey (1978) and
Graziano (2013).
4.1.2. Global workspace theory
In contrast with the higher-order theorist’s singular focus on self-
representation, other NCC theories emphasize more general functions
of information integration, flexible response selection, and coherent
behavioural coordination. But these theories differ in the specific forms
of integration and coordination they highlight and in the specific neural
substrates they posit. The Global Workspace (GW) Theory, originally
proposed by Baars (1988), equates consciousness with the broadcasting
of selected information across a network of modular processors. In a
GW architecture, isolated modules operate automatically, un-
consciously, and in parallel; collectively they have high information
capacity, but, working in isolation, are only able to perform routine
functions appropriate to familiar situations. When novel situations arise
for which isolated modules are unprepared, a subset of information is
selected for entry into the GW, where it is broadcast across the entire
network of specialist modules. Information sharing in the GW enables
processing that is integrated, coordinated, and flexible, but the narrow
information bandwidth of the GW entails accompanying costs in speed
and efficiency. Dehaene and Naccache (2001) proposed that the neural
substrate of the functional GW architecture in humans consists of as-
sociation areas, principally in frontal and parietal cortex, whose wide-
spread connections give them a central role in GW selection and
broadcasting.
This neuronal GW theory predicts that, in experimental contrasts
between conscious and matched unconscious processing, similar ac-
tivity should be elicited in relevant local modules as part of a fast, initial
forward-pass of processing. But conscious processing should be un-
iquely associated with a late “global ignition” of a distributed pattern of
reverberating activity, with special involvement of fronto-parietal as-
sociation areas. This core prediction finds support in a diverse range of
clinical and experimental comparisons, including masked vs. visible
stimuli (Dehaene et al., 2001), processing within vs. outside the at-
tentional blink (Sergent et al., 2005), behaviour in sleepwalking vs.
wakefulness (Bassetti et al., 2000), and in sensory responses (Laureys
et al., 2002) as well as behavioural output (Plum et al., 1998) in ve-
getative state patients vs. healthy subjects. More recently, however,
some researchers have argued the late global activation seen in these
studies may reflect the post-processing consequences of consciousness,
particularly those associated with stimulus report. This interpretation is
bolstered by recent findings from “no-report” and related paradigms,
which limit post-processing demands and which have yielded evidence
for earlier, more posterior, and less widely distributed correlates of
visual consciousness (Pitts et al., 2014; Tsuchiya et al., 2015; Koch
et al., 2016).
In assessing implications for animal consciousness, it is useful to
distinguish between two possible variants of GW theory. A broad ver-
sion of the theory would ascribe consciousness to any functionally si-
milar GW architecture, however physically realized. A narrow GW
theory, in contrast, would specifically associate consciousness with the
proposed neural substrate of the GW in humans (distributed neocortical
modules linked by fronto-parietal association areas). Both versions of
the theory would provide support for some non-human consciousness.
For example, “global ignition” events with strong PFC activation are
observed when rhesus monkeys detect (as indicated by a saccade to the
target) a visual image flashed close to the sub/supraliminal threshold,
but not when they fail to detect the same image on other trials (van
Vugt et al., 2018). But broad and narrow GW theories may carry dif-
ferent implications for evolutionarily remote (e.g., non-mammalian)
species. For example, birds confront their own problems of perceptual
integration and behavioural coordination, and it is not unreasonable to
ask whether they might also be solved by a GW architecture of some
kind. And certain avian families such as the corvids (crows, ravens,
jays, etc.) demonstrate cognitive skills that would be expected to re-
quire high-level cognitive processing in a mammal (Güntürkün and
Bugnyar, 2016). However, on the (speculative) assumption that bird
brains indeed employ a GW architecture (suggesting consciousness, on
the broad view), its neural substrate would differ, more or less radi-
cally, from ours (calling consciousness into doubt, on the narrow view).
When a corvid makes use of a novel tool (Bird and Emery, 2009) or
appears to recognize itself in a mirror (Prior et al., 2008), is there global
ignition of the avian pallium? A number of commentators have
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speculated about such processes in birds and other non-mammalian
vertebrate species (e.g. Braithwaite, 2010; Butler et al., 2005; Cabanac
et al., 2009; Paradis and Cabanac, 2004; Seth et al., 2005). Still farther
afield, Tye (2017, pp. 153–156) argues that bee brains may have a
miniature global workspace architecture of their own.
4.1.3. Integrated information theory
Integrated Information Theory (IIT; Tononi, 2008; Tononi et al.,
2016) shares GW theory’s broad emphasis on integration, but does not
tie this general function to a postulated GW or any other specific me-
chanism. Instead, IIT proposes a formal measure Φ of the quantity of
“integrated information” in any physical system whatsoever – that is, of
information encoded in the whole system that is lost whenever the
system is divided into parts. Unlike most NCC theories, in which con-
sciousness is an all-or-none dichotomy (Sergent and Dehaene, 2004),
IIT treats consciousness as a continuous variable, with higher Φ values
indicating more (i.e. fuller) consciousness. The claim is that neural
activity in structures like the cerebellum, with its independent modular
construction (resulting in low Φ), are largely unconscious, while ac-
tivity in the thalamocortical complex, with its extensive differentiation
(information) and interaction (integration), is high in Φ, and hence also
in consciousness. From an IIT vantage point, the NCC is likely to have a
broad thalamocortical distribution, with a finer delineation of its
boundaries requiring a closer study of the brain’s effective connectivity
(i.e., how causal perturbations propagate across, and come to be re-
presented in, the entire network). Empirical evidence for IIT comes
from observed correlations between the apparent emergence of con-
sciousness and rises in effective connectivity, in different sleep stages
(Massimini et al., 2005), anaesthesia (Ferrarelli et al., 2010), and
neurological disorders (Casali et al., 2013; Casarotto et al., 2016;
Rosanova et al., 2012). Because IIT does not posit a specific mechanism
of integration, it (unlike GW theory) is not threatened by recent evi-
dence suggesting a more posterior NCC for perception (Koch et al.,
2016). However, IIT faces challenges of its own. First, as has often been
noted, the exact computation of Φ is intractable for even moderately
complex systems, limiting the precision with which quantitative pre-
dictions of the theory can be tested. Second, it has recently been argued
that IIT entails improbable assignments of superhuman consciousness
to certain trivial computational systems (see Aaronson, 2014, and the
ensuing online debate).
An IIT perspective would open up a broad and remarkably open-
ended view of the possible distribution of animal consciousness. For IIT
does not tie consciousness to any specific functional mechanism or
physical substrate; any functional system with sufficiently high Φ will
possess it. Therefore, while the presence of structures homologous to
those with high Φ in humans is strong evidence for consciousness, the
absence of such structures is not strong evidence against it. Distant
evolutionary relatives may achieve comparable information integration
in divergent ways, potentially leading to a diverse array of quite dif-
ferent NCCs across the animal kingdom. But we needn’t stop with an-
imal consciousness; it has been noted that IIT suggests something like a
graded panpsychism, in which consciousness may be distributed in
varying degrees across inanimate as well as animate systems in the
physical world (Tononi and Koch, 2015).
4.1.4. The role of the brainstem
While the theories summarized above all localize the human NCC in
the cerebral hemispheres, others have suggested a primary neural
substrate for conscious experience in the upper brainstem. This sug-
gestion, which goes back to Penfield (1958, 1978), was recently revived
by Merker (2007). Like GW theory and IIT, Merker’s proposal empha-
sizes the functional importance of integration – in this case, of external
perception, internal motivation, and action selection – but it identifies
the core mechanism of integration as an evolutionarily ancient one,
centred in the brainstem and subsequently elaborated, in some lineages,
to include cortical contributions. Merker appeals to a range of human
and animal evidence for subcortical contributions to consciousness,
including the claim that hydranencephalic human children possess
consciousness despite largely lacking cortical tissue (Aleman and
Merker, 2014). To be sure, the brainstem hypothesis is a distinctly
minority view in modern human NCC research; upper brainstem ac-
tivity is more commonly seen as an “enabling condition” for, rather
than an immediate correlate of, conscious experience (Koch, 2004).
Nonetheless, the current evidence does not definitively exclude the
possibility that the upper brainstem is integrally involved in, perhaps
even sufficient for, certain forms of consciousness. Within the animal
neuroscience literature, (Panksepp, 1982, 1994, 2005; Panksepp et al.,
2017) most notably concurs with Merker’s subcortical view of con-
sciousness, especially affective consciousness, although the primary
region of interest he identifies is the periaqueductal gray (PAG) of the
midbrain. Naturally, such theories which localize the NCC to the
brainstem and other non-cortical regions would suggest an especially
sweeping distribution of animal consciousness. For example, Barron
and Klein (2016) argue that insect brains share structural and func-
tional similarities to vertebrate midbrains and hence may also confer
consciousness (for further discussions of invertebrate consciousness, see
also Edelman et al., 2005; Feinberg and Mallatt, 2016; Godfrey-Smith,
2017; Mason, 2011; Mather, 2008; Sherwin, 2001).
4.1.5. Translating NCC research to animals
The above sketch of NCC proposals, and the implications and
questions they suggest for animal consciousness, is necessarily in-
complete. The merits and demerits of each theory continue to be de-
bated, and it is not the goal of this paper to arbitrate between them.
Also, we have not discussed popular theories which associate con-
sciousness of perceptual content with circuits of recurrent processing
along the ventral stream (Lamme, 2006), or other accounts which
suggest alternative functional (e.g., attended intermediate representa-
tions; Prinz, 2012) and neural (e.g., the claustrum; Crick and Koch,
2005; Koubeissi et al., 2014) correlates of consciousness. Nonetheless,
while far from exhaustive, this brief review suggests some general
principles which are broadly relevant to the investigation of animal
consciousness in general and affective consciousness in particular.
First, NCC theories often propose an information processing func-
tion and an associated neural substrate. Typical functions involve in-
formation integration, working memory, flexible response selection,
coherent behavioural control, and/or aspects of self-representation.
These functions may be characterized in relation to specific mechan-
isms (e.g., a GW) or more general formal features (e.g., Φ). The neural
substrate associated with the relevant function is usually, but not al-
ways, assumed to be thalamocortical, perhaps (as in higher-order the-
ories and standard GW theory) with a critical PFC contribution. Second,
when a theory proposes a consciousness-associated function/substrate
pair, implications for the distribution of consciousness may depend on
whether the information processing function or the neural substrate is
regarded as critical. Third, it is important to note that neurofunctional
theories of human consciousness vary in how far the posited functions
are relevant to nonhuman species. In some cases (e.g., the more austere
and less permissive variants of higher-order theory (Carruthers, 2000),
or perhaps theories which link consciousness to specific theory-of-mind
functions that only become critical when social complexity is very
high), the functions associated with consciousness may be distinctive to
humans, perhaps together with our closest relatives. Other leading
theories, however, highlight functions and mechanisms (e.g., relating to
information integration and flexible control) with potentially broad
relevance to animal cognition, suggesting a far wider distribution of
nonhuman consciousness. They also suggest that gradations of con-
sciousness might exist across species, rather than the all-or-nothing
presence of full conscious capacities (e.g. see Fahrenfort et al., 2017).
Finally, these general theories of the NCC entail distinctive for-
mulations of the more specific question of conscious emotion in animals
(on the assumption that emotional and non-emotional contents of
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consciousness have broadly similar neural correlates; cf. LeDoux and
Brown, 2017). Thus, the higher-order theorist would ask whether an
animal in a given affective state appropriately represents itself as being
in such a state. The GW theorist would ask whether and what affective-
state information is broadcast in a (neurally or functionally defined)
workspace for the flexible coordination of modular processors. An IIT
proponent would ask whether, what, and how affective information is
irreducibly integrated into the animal’s neural network. If we knew the
right theory of the NCC, we would know the right questions to ask
about animal consciousness. In the present state of knowledge, we must
be content to make educated but cautious guesses about what the right
questions, and hence the possible answers, might be.
4.2. Information processing functions associated with consciousness
The search for neural substrates of consciousness has been the most
prominent feature of human consciousness research in recent years. But
in the animal literature, the potential for identifying information pro-
cessing functions of consciousness, and the search for parallel functions
in humans and non-human animals, have been emphasised. From a
comparative perspective, finding the types of information processing in
animals that are frequently (if not always; e.g. Persuh et al., 2018)
accompanied by self-report of conscious experience in humans has been
taken as important suggestive evidence for the presence of conscious
experience. To structure this search, it is useful to think of conscious
function in humans taking two distinct forms: the representation of in-
formation in consciousness and the processing or cognitive manipulation
of information consciously (Shea and Frith, 2016). Conscious re-
presentations concern the capacity of individuals to not just act on a
piece of information, but also to report it as known – i.e., have access to
the information processed (see Section 4.2. below for examples of how
animals can be trained to “report” information). Such individuals
should also show confident expectations regarding the outcomes of
actions based on that knowledge. The most studied example of this in
humans is conscious vision, although other examples of conscious re-
presentations exist, such as metacognition – conscious representations
of knowledge. Conscious processing in humans involves information
processing that can be deliberately controlled: The processing that
operates on conscious representations is itself conscious, and hence
subject to strategic control. For example, reasoned thoughts and cal-
culations, or something more informal, such as an envisioned ramble
through recollections of past events.
4.2.1. Representations and processing in animals
Below, we consider evidence for representations and processing of
information in non-human animals that resemble those that are con-
scious in humans. Phenomena related to conscious vision, metacogni-
tion, working memory and episodic memory have all received growing
research interest in recent years, with an increasing range of species
showing evidence for one or more of these capacities. While none of
these studies offer definitive proof that consciousness is involved, they
do offer some initial indications of the potential scope of information
processing functions of consciousness across the animal kingdom.
4.2.1.1. Vision. In humans, conscious vision, in which an individual
reports visual experiences and is confident in their visual judgements,
has been compared with blindsight, in which some objective measures
of sight remains, but, due to damage to the primary visual cortex, the
individual reports no visual experiences and feels that their visual
judgements are mere guesses (for reviews see Ajina and Bridge, 2017;
Stoerig and Cowey, 1997; Weiskrantz, 1986). The discovery of
blindsight was the starting point for much contemporary
consciousness research, because it provided, a powerful experimental
paradigm in which conscious and non-conscious representations could
be compared. It is also a phenomenon that has been extensively
investigated in non-human primates, as well as humans, from its
earliest days (e.g. Cowey and Stoerig, 1995; Hagan et al., 2017;
Humphrey, 1974; Yoshida and Isa, 2015). Dissociating (preserved)
visual functions from (absence of) awareness is straightforward in
humans where conscious experience tends to coincide with verbal
reports used to assess it. However, establishing whether monkeys are
also visually aware of the stimuli they respond to is a thornier issue. But
so-called “commentary procedures” can allow dissociation between
discrimination and awareness to be detected. Results demonstrate that
monkeys report ‘no awareness’ only for stimuli in the affected
(damaged) visual field, as they classify the very same stimuli they
were able to successfully discriminate in a forced-choice task as blank
trials when given the option to report whether it is present or absent
(Cowey and Stoerig, 1995; Yoshida and Isa, 2015). As a result of such
studies, the notion that monkeys such as rhesus macaques possess a
capacity for representational consciousness, in the sense of the presence
of dissociable features of consciously accessible and non-accessible
vision, is scarcely debated by contemporary researchers (Boly et al.,
2013). The possibility of a sight/blindsight distinction in other species,
however, as well as other similar contrasts in other senses, has been less
explored to date (e.g. Carey and Fry, 1993).
4.2.1.2. Metacognition. Another conscious function frequently
considered in the search for cognitive markers of consciousness in
animals is meta-cognition, the capacity of “knowing that one knows”,
or doesn’t know, a piece of information (Smith et al., 1995). For
example, in an early experiment also using rhesus macaques, subject
animals were required to make a choice between taking a memory test
regarding a previously observed image or opting out and not taking the
test at all (Hampton, 2001). Subsequent analyses showed that the
monkey’s success at remembering was associated with this gamble: they
were more often correct when they chose to take the test than when
they had to take the test without the opt-out option. Using a range of
methodologies, evidence has built for metacognitive capacities across a
range of species, including chimpanzees and orangutans (Call and
Carpenter, 2001), rhesus macaques (Macacca mulatta, Shields et al.,
1997; Hampton, 2001) and rats (Kepecs et al., 2008). In recent years,
the mechanisms of metacognition and its putative association with
consciousness have been greatly debated (Insabato et al., 2016; Smith
et al., 2014, 2016; Terrace and Son, 2009) and continue to be the
subjects of active controversy.
4.2.1.3. Episodic and working memory. Several lines of recent research
have examined the role of consciousness in memory processes and
representations, resulting in proposed cognitive and behavioural
markers for conscious memory. These include paradigms for assessing
the use of a range of memory representations (including trace vs delay
conditioning, delayed matching to sample tasks and episodic memory/
episodic future thinking tasks). For example, amongst most humans, the
past is not just remembered as if it were a list of facts; recollections are
accompanied by reports of rich conscious experiences, like snapshots or
video images of past scenes (Tulving, 1985). Damage to or ablation of
the hippocampus both eliminates these experiences and severely limits
recollection abilities (Rosenbaum et al., 2005). In healthy experimental
participants, these episodic memories have been found to carry a
number of facets of information content, including the identity,
location and timing of an event, leading them to also be described as
“what-where-when memories” (Clayton and Dickinson, 1998; Tulving,
1972). And it is these three features of episodic memory that have been
sought and found in a number of animal studies, including in birds
(Californian scrub jays; Clayton and Dickinson, 1998, 1999) and rats
(Crystal and Smith, 2014). However, the mechanisms of what-where-
when memories and the question of whether they necessarily require
consciousness remain a matter of debate (Crystal, 2018; Mendl and
Paul, 2008). For example, it is not yet known whether cases of
“aphantasia”, in which people report little or none of the (usually)
visual phenomenal content of episodic memories, are associated with
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functionally reduced capacity to recall what-where-when information
(Keogh and Pearson, 2018; Zeman et al., 2015).
Of all consciousness-associated processes observed and studied in
humans, working memory and its associated mechanisms has received
the greatest scrutiny (see Baddeley, 2003 for review). A number of
paradigms have been developed with a view to identifying conscious-
like processing in animals by assessing working memory capacities (e.g.
Dudchenko et al., 2013). In the hole-board task, for example, animals
are given a limited time in which to search an array of holes -in a board
for food rewards. The extent to which they avoid returning to pre-
viously searched holes, and thereby waste valuable foraging time, is
taken as a measure of their capacity to hold very recent events in
memory, as occurs in human working memory (Van der Staay et al.,
1990). Being able to efficiently forage from an array of potential sites is
a skill that can be expected to have been important for the survival of
many species, so it is not surprising that a number of mammals have
been found to show working memory-like capacities in this task in re-
cent years (mice, Kuc et al., 2006; rats, van der Staay et al., 1990; pigs,
Arts et al., 2009). Evidence for other species, including birds, has been
found additional tasks, including the matching-to sample task, which
has indicated working memory-like abilities in a range of species in-
cluding pigeons (Blough, 1959; Inman and Shettleworth, 1999;
Sargisson and White, 2001; Zentall and Smith, 2016), jungle crows
(Goto and Watanabe, 2009), rhesus macaques (Chelonis et al., 2014)
and zebrafish (Block et al., 2019; Bloch et al., 2019). However, the
extent to which these tasks simulate the complexities of information
handling that occurs in human working memory is debateable and if the
tasks are testing much simpler processes, the argument that these
processes are accompanied by conscious experiences is weakened.
5. Conscious affect: what are we searching for?
Having considered correlates of the general capacity for human and
animal consciousness, we now focus on the potential correlates of
conscious affect in particular. To progress in this task, it is first neces-
sary to be clear about the nature and structure of the phenomena that
we are searching for – conscious emotional experience. This will allow
us to circumscribe the search for conscious emotions to forms that are
most likely to occur in non-human animals, and to identify potential
complexities in associating measurable indicators with putative con-
scious experiences of affective states.
5.1. The structure of conscious affect: basic emotions, core affect and
constructionism
As we discussed in Sections 1 and 3, most emotion theorists take a
“componential” view of emotion. Central to this view is the finding
that, although they often work in concert, many of the components of
emotion are dissociable from one another (e.g. Anderson et al., 2003;
Fowles, 2000; Gray, 1994; Kihlstrom et al., 2000; Mammucari et al.,
1988; Meadows and Kaplan, 1994). In particular, there is mounting
evidence that there is not always a simple, one-to-one correspondence
between behavioural or physiological measures on one hand, and self-
reported, conscious components on the other (e.g. Barrett et al., 2004;
Flack et al., 1999; Gross et al., 2000; Lane et al., 1997; Mauss et al.,
2005; Meadows and Kaplan, 1994; Papciak et al., 1985; Reisenzein,
2000; Stone and Nielson, 2001). Some theorists have used this and
other evidence to conclude that conscious emotional feelings in humans
are not simply the inevitable consequences of the triggering of parti-
cular basic or discrete emotional systems, but active ‘constructions’,
built as a result of the combination of both top-down (expectation-
driven) and bottom-up (stimulus-driven) processing (e.g. see Adolphs,
2017; Wyczesany and Ligeza, 2015). Barrett (2017) argues that, similar
to other forms of conscious percept construction such as conscious vi-
sion or conscious memory, people do not experience their emotional
states as fully pre-formed packages. Instead, they experience bound
compounds of (a) core affective experience (e.g. feelings of valence and
arousal) and (b) predictive calculations, built on prior experience, of
what those feelings might mean and what actions will be needed to
respond to them. The Conceptual Act Theory (CAT) of emotion (Barrett,
2014; Barrett, 2017), proposes that emotional experiences are gener-
ated via a combination of bottom-up affective and top-down categor-
ization processes (based upon prior experience and mediated by con-
ceptual and linguistic knowledge; Barrett, 2006a, 2014; Barrett et al.,
2007). According to this constructionist analysis, the correlates of af-
fective consciousness might be expected to come in different guises – as
correlates of raw core-affective experiences, and also as correlates of
the constructed emotion (e.g. anger, grief), based on a more complex
blend of core-affective, cognitive, cultural and linguistic experiences
(see Section 5.2.).
From this constructionist perspective, non-linguistic animals would
not be expected to consciously experience anything akin to discretely
classified emotions in the human sense, whether basic or complex. For
example, in response to a question “Does a growling dog feel anger?”,
the answer is “…almost certainly no. Dogs do not have the emotion
concepts necessary to construct an instance of anger” (Barrett, 2017, p
269; see also Berridge, 2018 for further discussion of this issue). This
approach makes a strong distinction between the neural processes that
produce emotion-like behaviours in animals (e.g. flee or attack in re-
sponse to threat) and the equivalent emotions (e.g. fear, anger) as de-
fined, classified, named and experienced by humans (e.g. Barrett, 2017;
Barrett et al., 2007; Mobbs et al., 2019). But basic emotion theorists
such as Panksepp (1982; 2007; Panksepp and Watt, 2011) have pro-
posed alternative views, claiming that discrete emotions such as sad-
ness, anger and fear are fundamental building blocks of the neural-af-
fective system in animals and humans alike (see also Izard, 2011;
LeDoux, 2014b). From this standpoint, the key question is not whether
emotions occur at all in non-human species. Rather, it is whether the
neural architecture is in place for the expression of such states as
conscious experiences. Panksepp insisted that it is (in mammals, at
least), proposing that the subcortical structures themselves are able to
support affective consciousness (Panksepp, 2005). But this is not a
universal view. LeDoux (2014a; LeDoux and Brown, 2017), for ex-
ample, expects that cortical involvement is likely to be necessary for
consciousness of any kind, with various “survival circuits” operating
without the necessity of conscious involvement (LeDoux, 2012).
Of course, the notion that there are many distinct forms of emo-
tional experience in humans and potentially animals, is not exclusive to
contemporary constructionist theories. For example, appraisal theories
have long acknowledged vast arrays of different kinds of emotional
experience (Scherer, 2009), as have basic emotion theories (Ekman,
1994; Izard, 1992; Panksepp, 1982). Basic emotion theorists propose
that evolutionarily ancient neural programmes or schema can give rise
to a relatively small set of complete emotions, incorporating unified
suites of feelings, behavioural responses and physiological responses.
But these can ultimately result in more or less complex experiences, as a
result of cognitive elaboration, or hierarchical classification (e.g. clas-
sifying together different basic emotions on the basis of valence;
Tellegen et al., 1999). While debate has continued to rage over primacy
(Barrett, 2006b; Barrett et al., 2007; Izard, 2007; Panksepp, 2007),
there is no question that people can and do report their emotional ex-
periences in a wide variety of ways (Russell, 1991; Yik et al., 2011).
5.2. The structure of conscious affect: language, culture, and cognition
Culture, language and cognition all play important roles in defining
and characterising facets of human emotional experience (e.g. see Watt-
Smith, 2015). While it is important to make a distinction between the
processes of describing and experiencing an emotion (Charland, 2005;
Lambie and Marcel, 2002), the issue of how these human-centred
processes influence and determine the felt experience is an important
problem. And this is especially so for anyone seeking to investigate the
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possibility of conscious affective states occurring in animals. Which
emotions are likely to be uniquely human in nature (or uniquely an-
imal; Nagel, 1974)? And which facets of conscious emotion might we
also hypothesise to occur in other species?
Some complex emotions are relevant only to certain individuals or
situations and are not discretely recognised across all cultures, let alone
outside the human species (Lutz and White, 1986; Russell, 1991; Storm
and Storm, 1987). Some others, such as respect, pride or regret may be
more commonplace, but may still be associated with syntactic manip-
ulation or linguistic labelling (Johnson-Laird and Oatley, 1989; Shaver
et al., 1992). And some are also dependent on conscious capacities such
as episodic memory and episodic future thinking (recollection and an-
ticipation; Mendl and Paul, 2008). Many of these types of complex
emotions have not been studied in animals. However, a number of re-
cent experimental studies have been used to investigate whether jea-
lousy-like and envy-like responses might occur in some form in non-
human species. These have produced somewhat mixed results, but
evidence points to responses indicative of some degree of “inequity
aversion” occurring in a range of species (e.g. chimpanzees – Hopper
et al., 2014; capuchin monkeys – Brosnan and deWaal, 2003; rats –
Oberliessen et al., 2016; ravens – Massen et al., 2015; dogs – Range
et al., 2009), and “jealousy” in the domestic dog (e.g. see Abdai et al.,
2018; Harris and Prouvost, 2014; McGetrick and Range, 2018; although
see also Prato-Previde et al., 2018). Whether or not these responses are
accompanied by conscious feelings, is not yet established.
The tendency to anthropomorphize animals and make unwarranted
inferences regarding human-like emotions is strong and there is a broad
consensus amongst researchers to guard against this. A case in point is
guilt. Many dog owners express the belief that their pets can experience
guilt (Morris et al., 2008). They report seeing guilty or shame-like be-
haviour, including flattened ears and a retracted tail posture, when
their dog is found to have transgressed in some way (e.g. eaten some
human food or taken a child’s toy). But consciousness of guilt requires
not only a negative feeling of some kind, but also an understanding that
this is the result of an action that has broken an established rule. Using
an experimental design that gave dogs the opportunity to eat a desir-
able treat while their owners were out of the room, Horowitz (2009)
found that in fact, dogs do not demonstrate any behavioural responses
unique to transgressing a rule (e.g. “leave”; “do not touch”). Some do,
however, show “guilt-like” postures and behaviours when they expect
to be admonished or punished by a human carer, regardless of any
knowledge of transgression (see also Hecht et al., 2012).
Different approaches to the nature of emotion and its fundamental
building blocks have pointed to different possibilities regarding the
nature and structure of animal affects and emotions, conscious or not.
The constructionist view suggests that certain non-linguistic animals
might experience something akin to human core affective states (i.e.
affective valence and arousal; Barrett 2017). But if one takes basic or
discrete emotions to be the fundamental building blocks of all conscious
emotional experiences, core affective experiences would either not be
registered at all in non-linguistic animals, or would be post-hoc con-
structions/classifications, requiring some degree of categorical or cog-
nitive processing to occur. Evidence from the animal literature re-
garding these issues is mixed. There is no doubt that many species show
particular behaviours or suites of behaviour (akin to fear, anger, panic,
etc.) when presented with affectively salient stimuli (Panksepp, 1982).
It has also long been known that such behaviours can be triggered by
external stimulation of certain sub-cortical brain regions (e.g. Reis and
Gunne, 1965; Stellar and Stellar, 1985; Burgdorf et al., 2000). But there
is also evidence in favour of core-affect-like processes operating in
animals, for example in the form of distinctive and consistent responses
being made to different but similarly valenced stimuli (e.g. transrein-
forcer blocking: Bakal et al., 1974; Balleine and Dickinson, 2006;
Ganesan and Pearce, 1988), learned valenced responses to electrical
brain stimulation (Burgdorf et al., 2000) and “optimistic” and “pessi-
mistic” behavioural decisions being induced by a wide range of
valenced affective manipulations (Harding et al., 2004; Paul et al.,
2005). Perhaps in future, debates regarding the basic building blocks of
emotion in animals and humans will become more nuanced, in-
corporating both basic and core affective structures (e.g. see Izard,
2011; LeDoux, 2014b).
5.3. Peripheralist and centralist perspectives on conscious emotion:
implications for measurement
Averill (1980, 1994), made the important observation that human
affective experiences are likely to arise in more than one manner: we
can have feelings of, feelings about and feelings like. The feelings of
category aligns with peripheralist views of emotion, in which emotional
feelings arise as a result of someone sensing or observing their own
body reacting emotionally. For example, a person might feel afraid if
they sense their heart thumping, their hands sweating and their legs
running away (James, 1884; Lange and James, 1922). Embodied con-
scious affective experiences based on sensations of autonomic arousal,
emotive facial expressions and emotion-relevant postures are thus ex-
amples of feelings of (see Section 6.3.). Strong emotions of many dif-
ferent kinds incorporate these sorts of experiences, which are central to
contemporary embodiment theories of emotion, and they fit very well
with twentieth century notions of emotion as large-scale physiological
and bodily events (e.g. Schachter and Singer, 1962; but see also Duffy,
1957 for an alternative view). This approach has been revitalized in
contemporary neuroscience by scholars such as Damasio (1999), Park
and Tallon-Baudry (2014); Critchley and Garfinkel (2017) and Barrett
(2017), to account for the subjective dimension of perceptual experi-
ence, including emotions. These authors propose to root subjective
experience in the neural representation of visceral information which is
transmitted through multiple anatomical path ways to a number of
cortical target sites, including posterior insula, ventral anterior cingu-
late cortex, amygdala and somatosensory cortex. The “neural subjective
frame” is not explicitly experienced by itself but is a necessary, albeit
not sufficient, component of perception and is postulated to underlie
other types of subjective experiences such as self-consciousness and
emotional feelings.
It is worth noting, however, that these ‘feelings of’ and their map-
ping at the central neural level occur to a lesser extent in milder per-
turbations of affect, such as minor preferences recruited to make ev-
eryday decisions (“Tea or coffee?” “Chocolate cake or Victoria
sponge?”). Similarly, they are also less likely to be a feature of affective
states that are not associated with active behavioural responses (i.e.
more cognitively centred emotions such as remorse and regret). In
animals, therefore, such autonomic measures of animal affect may be of
most accessible in the study of intense emotion-like states.
Cannon’s (1929) alternative to the James-Lange peripheralist stance
characterized emotional feelings as occurring directly as a result of
central nervous system activity, and only secondarily giving rise to the
many other aspects of emotion, including behavioural responses and
physiological arousal. Debate between this centralist view and James’
and Lange’s peripheralist position has lost much of its vigour (e.g. see
Ekman et al., 1983; Levenson, 1992). Neither position on its own tells a
complete story, and the contribution of each to human conscious
emotional experience varies between individuals and circumstances
(e.g. see Burriss et al., 2007; Dalgleish, 2004; Wiens et al., 2000; Wiens,
2005). Instead, the centralist position can be seen as aligning most
closely with a different facet of felt emotion: Averill’s ‘feelings about’
category. Jung (1971/1921); Jung, 1971 talked about emotions as
“evaluations of situations or objects”: feelings about things such as a
delicious meal or a reviled piece of music (see also Berridge and
Robinson, 2003; Berridge et al., 2009; Scherer, 2005a,b; Zajonc, 1980;
regarding liking and preferences). These are valenced affective judge-
ments, in which the value of a situation or stimulus is consciously re-
gistered: positive or negative, pleasant or unpleasant, rewarding or
punishing. Perhaps these feelings can be the most prominent of all the
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facets of affective experience.
A potential proxy measure of these “feelings about” in animals may
be the assessment of animal choices and preferences (e.g. Engel et al.,
2014; Kirkden and Pajor, 2006). However, we should be aware that
choice can be effected in a number of different ways. For example,
preference in the context of multiple choices can be quite different to
liking or disliking an individual stimulus. Choices in value-based deci-
sion paradigms can be driven by Pavlovian, habitual, or goal-directed
processes that may vary in how closely they reflect consciously ex-
perienced pleasure or displeasure. Formal investigations of whether and
how positive and negative feelings in humans are associated with these
different kinds of evaluation would help inform their use as indicators
of conscious affect in animals.
Feelings like concern anticipated instrumental responses, such as “I
felt like running away” or “I feel like crying”. These types of conscious
affective experiences correspond to a view of emotions as preparatory
action sets or tendencies (Frijda, 1986; Öhman et al., 2000; Panksepp,
1994). Instead of being to do with a feeling of the body acting, they are
feelings associated with preparations or intentions to act, and are likely
to result from interoceptive sensations of the commencement of the
action (i.e. a peripheral process). They may also involve registration of
a form of action motivation, action readiness, or action inhibition, as a
centralist process (c.f. action tendencies; Lowe and Ziemke, 2011).
Potential measures in animals include anticipatory behaviour occurring
in the presence of predictive cues (e.g. Spruijt, 2001). As with feelings
of, feelings like seem to be most associated with strong emotions that
incorporate active (or expressive) behavioural responses. Anticipatory
actions may thus be useful indicators of these states in animals, but not
of other affective states that are so mild or diffuse that they are unlikely
to incorporate feelings like at all.
In conclusion, the emerging message is that conscious affect is not a
unitary phenomenon and so we should be clear about the type of
conscious emotion-like states that we are seeking to assess in other
species – a simple discrete emotion-like state, a valenced affective state,
a cognitively complex emotion-like state. Furthermore, specific in-
dicators may be more likely to reveal one type of conscious affective
experience than another – autonomic activation and anticipatory be-
haviours may be particularly suited to the assessment of more intense
feelings of and feelings like affective states, whilst choice and preference
may tell us more about feelings about states.
6. Neural correlates of affective consciousness
With the details of Section 5 in mind, we now adapt the NCC ap-
proach outlined in Section 4 to consider neural correlates of affective
consciousness (NCACs). Affective states in humans have been asso-
ciated with the involvement of numerous cortical and subcortical brain
regions, including the prefrontal cortex, insula, cingulate cortex,
amygdala, thalamus, nucleus accumbens, ventral pallidum, periaque-
ductal grey, etc. (e.g. Davidson et al., 1999; Phan et al., 2002). How-
ever, much remains unresolved regarding the contributions of specific
areas to conscious vs. non-conscious components of emotion. In this
section, we first revisit the NCC theories discussed in Section 4. From
the vantage point of each theory, we ask what shape the NCACs would
be expected to take, and how, if the theory is accepted, conscious
emotional contents could in principle be inferred from neural data.
We then turn from principle to practice, considering theoretically
less pristine but empirically more tractable methods which may help
guide the search for NCACs in the near term. We focus on the different
types of study that may help us address this issue: for example, studies
of individuals with brain injuries or other pathologies which render
them incapable of feeling emotions, even though they may nevertheless
be able to “do” emotions in other respects (Section 6.2), and studies of
non-clinical, naturally occurring, between-subject variation in people’s
ability to detect the conscious features of their emotions (Section 6.3).
Finally, in Section 6.4, we consider the implications of these findings for
animals.
6.1. General theoretical considerations
In Section 4.1, we outlined several influential theories of the NCC,
each of which associate consciousness with an information processing
function implemented in a particular neural substrate. Even if these
theories don’t explain why the function/substrate in question is ac-
companied by experience (a question some take to be beyond the reach
of human understanding; DuBois-Reymond, 1874; McGinn, 1989), they
nonetheless furnish candidate empirical criteria for both the identifi-
cation of consciousness and the decoding of its contents. That is, if we
knew that one of the current NCC theories were correct, and if our
capacity to measure neural activity were unconstrained, the theory
would give us a recipe for reading off the information content of con-
sciousness from observations of the brain. If the theory applies to all
conscious contents, it would, in particular, allow us to measure the
affective contents of consciousness – i.e., whether it includes informa-
tion related to the valence and to the motivational meaning of internal
states and/or external objects. Translating to animals, such an ideal
read-out might not illuminate what it is like (in the sense of Nagel,
1974) to have the organism’s emotional experience, but it would specify
what, if any, affective information was consciously experienced, as well
as the relationship of that affective code to other consciously available
information (e.g. interoceptive sensation of heartbeat, etc.).
Of course, there is no accepted consensus as to which, if any, of
today’s NCC theories is on the right track, and existing measures of
neural activity are far from ideal. Thus, in practice, we must make do
with tentative interpretations of data that are invariably imperfect,
though improving in quality at an accelerating pace (see Section 6.2).
Still, it is instructive to consider what, under ideal conditions, the
empirical signatures of conscious emotion would look like according to
currently influential theories of the NCC and how these might be sought
in animals.
For theories of the NCC focusing on information integration and/or
flexible behavioural coordination (i.e. ITT and GW theory; Baars, 1988;
Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Tononi, 2008; Tononi et al., 2016) the
question assumes the following form: What, if any, affective informa-
tion is integrated to a sufficient degree and/or in the theoretically re-
levant behaviour-guiding way? Note that this functionally integrated
information could be continuous (à la variations in core affect) and/or
categorical (à la basic emotions or more complex cultural-linguistic
constructions). But importantly, on any theory of this general kind, one
would expect conscious contents to have some kind of “affective tone,”
albeit one that could differ widely across species. For if information is
integrated for the flexible control of behaviour, it should presumably
encompass not only perceptual items, but also (in one way or another)
their motivational significance for the organism – i.e., the valence of
perceptual affordances in relation to (possibly fine-grained aspects of)
the organism’s present internal state and behavioural goals.
Particular theories imply more specific procedures for decoding the
contents of consciousness. In GW theory, the ideal measurement
strategy would be remarkably straightforward: Simply eavesdrop on the
brain’s (limited-capacity) for global broadcast. For animal brains with
attention and executive control networks resembling ours, this would
presumably involve recording and decoding the outputs of frontopar-
ietal neurons with wide cortical projections (Dehaene and Naccache,
2001; van Vugt et al., 2018). The question of conscious emotion would
then reduce to the question of whether and how signals in the putative
frontoparietal broadcast encode stimulus valence in relation to affective
behavioural control (emotional and motivational consciousness).
The ideal measurement of conscious emotion is less conceptually
simple in IIT, because it associates consciousness with a general net-
work property (Φ) rather than a specific computational mechanism, and
because of the practical challenges in computing Φ for all but the
simplest systems. Yet if, computational barriers notwithstanding, a
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general “Φ-meter” for information networks could somehow be de-
vised, the contributions of different emotion-related areas to the brain’s
“main complex” (Tononi and Sporns, 2003), and hence to the animal’s
conscious experience, could in principle be measured. Perhaps more
realistically, but still ambitiously, if methods of assessing effective
connectivity (e.g., Massimini et al., 2005; Rosanova et al., 2012) are
sufficiently enhanced, it may eventually be possible to more finely
characterize how precise local perturbations of specific emotion-related
areas (e.g., amygdala vs. insula) as well as other areas (e.g., primary
visual vs. inferior temporal cortex) do or don’t globally propagate
across the cortex, an operational measure of information integration.
From the perspective of higher-order theories (HOT and HOE: Lau
and Passingham, 2006; Lau and Rosenthal, 2011), the authentic neu-
rofunctional signature of conscious emotion should be some form of
emotional metacognition (“metaemotion”), presumably implemented
in circuits prominently involving the dorso-lateral PFC. But the details
will depend on which of the numerous variants of higher-order theory
one adopts – some of which require the self-application of a sophisti-
cated theory of mind (e.g., Carruthers, 2000) while others focus on
simpler forms of metacognition (e.g., calibration of behaviour to evi-
dential confidence; Lau and Rosenthal, 2011). Animals that are cur-
rently known to show such capabilities are primarily mammalian.
6.2. Neural correlates of ‘doing’ and feeling emotion
In the search for neural correlates of perceptual consciousness, re-
searchers have generally employed the contrastive method to compare
neural activity in apparently matched cases of conscious vs. non-con-
scious perception. It is natural to employ a similar strategy in the search
for NCACs, contrasting neural concomitants of conscious vs. un-
conscious affect.
In seeking to make this contrast, it is important to draw a distinction
between the unconscious perception of emotional stimuli and the un-
conscious occurrence of emotional or affective states themselves. The
first focus is comparatively straightforward, and a wealth of human
research has identified neural and behavioural responses to affective
properties of reportedly unseen visual stimuli. For example, subliminal
fearful expressions and emotion words spur heightened amygdala ac-
tivity (e.g., Naccache et al., 2005; Whalen et al., 1998; Tamietto and
deGelder, 2010), and subliminal reward-predictive symbolic cues can
apparently drive instrumental conditioning, with associated activity in
the amygdala and ventral striatum (Pessiglione et al., 2008). Similarly,
patients with damage to primary visual cortex sometimes exhibit
blindsight not only for simple perceptual properties like location and
line orientation, but also for emotional facial expressions and body
postures (Pegna et al., 2005; Tamietto et al., 2009; Celeghin et al.,
2015; De Gelder et al., 1999; Burra et al., 2019; Bertini et al., 2013).
Unseen emotional stimuli in this kind of “affective blindsight” induce
spontaneous facial mimicry or physiological arousal and have also been
linked to activity in a subcortical pathway relaying non-consciously
processed visual information to the amygdala (Morris et al., 2001;
Pegna et al., 2005; Tamietto et al., 2009; Tamietto et al., 2012). Un-
conscious perceptual analysis, associated with activity in relevant local
circuits, thus appears to extend to the coding of affectively significant
stimulus properties.
Turning from stimuli to states, a natural strategy for NCAC research
is to search for unconscious emotional-state syndromes – i.e., cases in
which multiple (behavioural, physiological, etc.) components of an
emotion are demonstrated without any actual feeling of a conscious
emotional state. When subliminal emotional stimuli support learning
(e.g., Pessiglione et al., 2008) or generate autonomic reactions (e.g.,
Gläscher and Adolphs, 2003), it is tempting to infer that components of
emotional response must be occurring in the absence of consciously felt
emotion. Note, however, that this inference assumes that the affective
properties of unseen stimuli leave no trace on global conscious affect.
While not implausible, this assumption is rarely directly tested in
studies of unconscious perception of affective stimuli (although see
Winkielman et al., 2005 for an example of a behavioural paradigm
which specifically examines this assumption).
Frontal brain injuries have been documented to be associated with a
number of significant emotion-related deficits, including difficulties in
emotional control, and in the anticipation of future positive and ne-
gative emotional states (e.g. Bechara et al., 2000; Engberg and
Teasdale, 2004). However, as yet, no comprehensively documented
clinical cases have linked specific lesion sites to unconscious emotion
syndromes, although the possibility of such unconscious emotion has
been discussed theoretically (e.g. Kihlstrom et al., 2000; Lane et al.,
1997) and some candidate cases have been reported (e.g. Nielsen et al.,
2000). Plum et al. (1998) describe a patient with a vegetative state
diagnoses, clinically considered to have no (perceptual, emotional, or
other) consciousness, but who nonetheless exhibited extreme stereo-
typed rage reactions upon stimulation, with multiple behavioural and
autonomic components (e.g., screaming, clenched teeth, and elevated
blood pressure). The researchers attributed this putative emotional
automatism to the isolated operation of a network of relatively active
right hemisphere cortical and subcortical areas, against a backdrop of
more globally depressed cerebral metabolism.
Biraben et al. (2001) found that epileptic seizures which involve the
amygdala, anterior cingulate cortex and prefrontal cortex are often
accompanied by subjective feelings of fear, while comparable seizures
which involve the amygdala alone are not associated with fearful
feelings. These findings concur with others that have shown that
amygdala damage is not associated with deficits in the subjective ex-
perience of emotion (even though some behavioural and physiological
responses are impaired) (e.g. Anderson and Phelps, 2002; although see
also Feinstein et al., 2011 for contrary results), while anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) damage has been found to significantly impair conscious
affective experiences (Phan et al., 2002). So, although both structures
have clear importance in the processing of emotion, only the ACC may
be necessary for certain facets of conscious emotional experience.
The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and ventromedial pre-frontal cortex
(vmPFC) are well known to be involved in the valuation of both pri-
mary and secondary reinforcers in humans (e.g. the pleasantness of
food and more abstract reinforcers such as money or music) and pa-
tients with OFC and vmPFC lesions demonstrate significant abnormal-
ities of affective decision making (see Chib et al., 2009; Kringelbach and
Rolls, 2004). This frontal region has been suggested by some to be
important in the generation of conscious emotion components such as
affective valence in humans (e.g. see Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004;
Kringelbach, 2005). But evidence from OFC damaged patients has not
offered a clear case for non-conscious affect. People diagnosed with
developmental psychopathy, a condition also associated with frontal-
cortical abnormalities, appear to show an almost opposite syndrome:
verbally reporting emotions such as fear, yet exhibiting little or no
behavioural or physiological fearfulness (Herpertz et al., 2001; Patrick
et al., 1993, 1994).
Another area relevant for attention and consciousness is the parietal
cortex (PC). Damage to the right PC often causes hemispatial neglect,
wherein patients do not represent and react to stimuli in the con-
tralateral side of the lesion. However, emotional (typically fearful) ex-
pressions presented to the neglected side of the space tend to summon
attention and to be consciously detected more often than neutral stimuli
(Vuilleumier et al., 2002; Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 2001; Williams &
Mattingley, 2004; Tamietto et al., 2007, 2015). Consciously perceived
emotions are uniquely associated with activity in areas that map so-
matic (i.e., visceral and somatosensory) changes, such as the insula and
somatosensory cortex (see Section 6.3. below).
Finally, the relationship between “doing” emotion or affect (i.e.,
enacting emotional expressions and behaviour) and subjective feelings
has been addressed directly in a series of studies applying intracortical
electrical micro-stimulation to patients with pharmacologically re-
sistant epilepsy (Caruana et al., 2015; Caruana et al., 2018). Electrical
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stimulation of the ACC in the pregenual sector (pACC) elicited bursts of
laugher that in half of the subjects was also accompanied by conscious
positive affect (Caruana et al., 2015). Likewise, electric stimulation of
the amygdala evokes visceromotor responses typical of response to
threat that are also accompanied by subjective feelings of fear (Meletti
et al., 2006), akin of that observed for anterior insula and disgust
(Krolak-Salmon et al., 2003). These findings demonstrate at the micro-
scale level of a few limited neurons, that expression and experience of
emotions actually map into a common neural code that helps situate
agency as a core feature of emotional experience. However, a more
recent study has challenged this conclusion with observations that
precise amygdala stimulation can increase electrodermal activity and
heart rate, without eliciting any changes in conscious experience
(Inman et al., in press).
6.3. Neural correlates of individual variation in emotional awareness
Individual variation in conscious emotional awareness has been
studied across a number of different strands of research. One to receive
particular attention in the clinical and psychosomatic literature in
particular is the study of alexithymia. Alexithymia is a variable trait
within the normal population, comprising reduced emotional experi-
ence and difficulty in recognizing and labelling emotions (Bagby et al.,
1994; Lane et al., 1997; Smith et al., 2019; Lane et al., 2015; Stone and
Nielson, 2001). It has high levels of co-morbidity with neurodevelop-
mental disorders such as autism and is associated with depression and a
range of somatising disorders (Li et al., 2015; Honkalampi et al., 2019).
Alexithymic symptoms have also been found among cerebral commis-
surotomy patients, prompting the suggestion that difficulty recognizing
and describing emotional feeling states may result from inadequate
connections between the right, “emotional hemisphere” and the left,
“linguistic hemisphere” of most human brains (Hoppe and Bogen,
1977). Some studies have supported such interhemispheric theories of
alexithymia, showing that alexithymic individuals tend to have some
degree of transfer deficit between the two sides of the brain (e.g. Romei
et al., 2008; Zeitlin et al., 1989). But not all studies have confirmed this
(e.g. Grabe et al., 2004), and alternative hypotheses have been pro-
posed (e.g. Lane, 2008; Tabibnia and Zaidel, 2005). Most prominently,
Lane (2008) suggested that alexithymia may be an abnormality of the
vertical rather than horizontal axis of the human brain, resulting from
inadequate development of neural connections between the evolutio-
narily “older” emotional centres (brainstem, diencephalon, limbic
system) and more recently evolved regions (paralimbic, prefrontal
cortex). This, he argued, might lead to reduced conscious awareness of
ongoing (sub-cortical) emotional processes and less top-down regula-
tion of them. A number of studies of the brain activity of normal in-
dividuals varying in emotional awareness have provided some support
for these ideas. Using positron emission tomography (PET), Lane and
colleagues (Lane et al., 1998) found that higher levels of emotional
awareness in women (i.e. greater ability to detect and classify emo-
tional feelings; Lane et al., 1990) were associated with greater regional
cerebral blood flow in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) when
participants recalled emotional events or viewed emotive film clips.
McRae et al. (2008) found a similar correlation between levels of
emotional awareness and blood flow in the dACC, but on this occasion,
it was clear that the association was dependent on the arousal qualities
of the emotional stimuli being viewed, but not their valence (i.e. the
correlation only occurred when participants, males and females, viewed
highly arousing emotive pictures; no differences in dACC blood flow
were found for positive vs negative pictures). Mantani et al. (2005)
found reduced posterior cingulate cortex activation during emotional
imagery tasks in alexithymic individuals. And more recently, meta-
analytic studies have found evidence for associations between alex-
ithymia and functional alterations during emotion processing in the
amygdala, insula and medial prefrontal cortex (van der Velde et al.,
2013) and structural alterations (reduced volumes) in the left insula,
left amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex and striatum. Taken together, these
studies suggest heterogeneous and predominantly cortical deficits in
alexithymia (see also Xu et al., 2018). However, the extent to which
these findings are associated with conscious emotional feelings per se,
or with the capacity to name and put words to those feelings, is not yet
clear (Aleman, 2005).
Research into individual variation in conscious interoceptive ex-
perience has tended to be largely independent of studies of alexithymia.
If much or all of our emotional feelings arise from sensed physiological
changes inside the body, it follows that an ability to monitor bodily
responses is an important pre-requisite of a capacity to consciously
experience emotion. Certainly, people’s verbal descriptions of their
emotions often include descriptions of conscious interoceptive experi-
ences (Nummenmaa et al., 2014). The term interoception refers to the
multitude of processes by which the internal states of the body
(heartrate, blood pressure, blood glucose levels, gut activity, in-
flammation, etc.) are monitored, and is closely associated with per-
ipheralist views of emotion. Currently a rapidly advancing field of re-
search (e.g. see Critchley and Garfinkel, 2017; Khalsa et al., 2018; Pace-
Schott et al., 2019), numerous interoceptive systems have been iden-
tified in humans, involving a range of afferent pathways (for reviews
see: Craig, 2004; Critchley and Harrison, 2013; Strigo and Craig, 2016).
Of course, not all of these diverse processes of interceptive sensing
necessarily result in consciously felt sensations or emotions. Many
contemporary accounts of the role of interoception in emotion in-
corporate Bayesian conceptions of predictive coding (Barrett and
Simmons, 2015; Seth and Friston, 2016). These point to a major func-
tion of interoception being one in which predictions, data acquisition
(through interoceptive sensing) and prediction error signal generation
produce bodily responses which maintain homeostasis. And this may
often occur without the need for any kind of conscious emotional in-
volvement (e.g. via reflexive and humoral action). Conscious sensing of
the internal melieu of the body, such as heartbeat detection, and the
conscious emotional sequelae of this, can be hypothesised to function to
achieve homeostasis in two ways. First, it can act by motivating or
guiding behaviourally appropriate responses (e.g. moving from a sunny
to a shady location to prevent overheating), and second, by enabling
individuals to prioritize urgent behavioural responses (e.g. fleeing from
threat) over ongoing physiological, non-conscious, allostasis (McEwen
and Wingfield, 2003; Pace-Schott et al., 2019). Of note here is the
finding that, at the neural level, vertical processes, similar to those
identified within alexithymia research, are involved in conscious in-
teroceptive sensing and emotion (although see Nicholson et al., 2018).
For example, arterial baroreceptor-mediated heartbeat detection leads
to activations within the insula cortex and has also been found to have
rapid and measurable effects on both conscious affective experience
and cognitive-affective processing (Critchley and Garfinkel, 2017;
Garfinkel and Critchley, 2016; Garfinkel et al., 2014; Strigo and Craig,
2016). While further research into the neural correlates of individual
differences in accurate and consciously registered interoception is still
required (e.g. see Garfinkel et al., 2015), the role of cortical regions
(posterior, mid and anterior insular cortex, cingulate and pre-frontal
cortices) and their interaction with sub-cortical regions (amygdala and
striatum) are currently the primary focus (see Garfinkel and Critchley,
2016 for recent review).
6.4. Implications for animals
The validity of translating knowledge of neural and functional
correlates of affective consciousness in humans to other animal species
will inevitably be constrained by the degree of structural and functional
similarity between their brains and ours. Research in this field is still in
its infancy, but examples do exist. Demonstrating that lesions to the
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in rats resulted in impaired decision-
making in a rat variant of the Iowa Gambling Task, van den Bos et al.
(2014) also showed that these impairments were similar to those
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observed in humans with lesions of the vmPFC, indicating some func-
tional and anatomical equivalence. The role of conscious affect in such
tasks has been discussed at length in human studies, and it is possible to
speculate that damage to the mPFC interferes with decision-making in
both species via disruptions to conscious experience of affect or inter-
oception (e.g. “somatic markers”; Damasio, 1999). However, Damasio
and colleagues have been equivocal as to whether conscious emotion is
necessary to act as a ‘somatic marker’ in this kind of decision-making; in
future, clearer human models of conscious vs non-conscious affect are
likely to prove a more appropriate starting point (see Section 6.2).
A different approach has been to use manipulations of brain areas
that, in humans, are associated with conscious affect, to identify be-
haviours that may be potential markers of equivalent, conscious affect
in animals. For example, Langford et al. (2010) studied facial ‘grimace’
expressions as indicators of pain in mice. They found that damage to the
rostral anterior insula, an area of the brain implicated in human con-
scious experience of the affective unpleasantness of pain, resulted in
attenuation of grimace expressions but not of other behaviours such as
abdominal constriction. They speculated that this might indicate the
utility of grimaces, but not abdominal constrictions, as markers of
conscious pain as opposed to just sensory nociception. Of course, such
reasoning requires one to accept that, as in humans, the rostral anterior
insula also plays a role in conscious affective pain in mice.
To move forward in this area, it will be important to consider the
practical and theoretical backgrounds from which to approach com-
parative investigations of consciousness and conscious affect in humans
and a range of non-human animals. Amongst human observers, there is
tremendous individual variation in beliefs about animal consciousness
and sentience (capacity to consciously experience feelings and emo-
tions; Phillips and McCulloch, 2005; Spence et al., 2017). But there is
also a strong agreement and emphasis on a phylogenetic distribution of
conscious capabilities across the animal kingdom, with smaller and
smaller-brained species (invertebrates, fish, amphibians, etc.) being
regarded as less intelligent and less sentient than larger and larger-
brained ones (e.g. mammal, primates; Clarke and Paul, 2019; Kupsala
et al., 2016; Nakajima et al., 2002; Walker et al., 2014). And this view is
recapitulated in much legislation, with primates, mammals and verte-
brates being given most legal protection (Home Office, 1986). How-
ever, such phylogenetic approaches have significant limitations and are
inevitably vulnerable to anthropomorphic biases (Dacey, 2017).
Within the realm of comparative cognition, the questions of whether
and to what extent animals differ in cognitive capacities such as general
intelligence, learning ability or specific skills, such as spatial memory,
have been studied and discussed extensively (Zentall, 2013). Both inter-
and intra-specific studies have provided support for a connection be-
tween brain size (including brain size corrected for body size) and
cognitive capacity (Buechel et al., 2018; Horschler et al., 2019; Kilmer
and Rodriguez, 2019; Kotrschal et al., 2013; Overington et al., 2009).
There is also evidence for connections between the size of particular
brain regions (e.g. PFC and hippocampus) and specific cognitive ca-
pacities (social intelligence and spatial memory – Dunbar and Shultz,
2007; Hampton and Shettleworth, 1996). But qualitative as well as
quantitative differences between the brains of animals from different
phylogenetic groups make such comparisons between species highly
problematic. For example, mammalian primate and non-primate cor-
tices differ in a number of important respects, including volume/neuron
density ratios (Herculano-Houzel et al., 2007, 2012, 2017). And bird
and mammal brains differ radically, with the avian nidopallium cau-
dolaterale (NCL) displaying few anatomical similarities to the mam-
malian PFC (Güntürkün and Bugnyar, 2016). Nevertheless, it has
proven surprisingly difficult to conclusively demonstrate extensive and
systematic variation in cognitive capacities between such groups of
animals (Pearce, 2008). While some differences certainly do exist, there
is a growing body of evidence showing that cognitive capacities can
transcend phylogenetic boundaries, even including the vertebrate –
invertebrate distinction (e.g. Japyassu and Laland, 2017; Schnell and
Clayton, 2019; Simons and Tibbetts, 2019 for description of cognitive
skills in spiders and other invertebrates). In sum, it is now widely ac-
cepted that variation in the cognitive capabilities of animals can be
attributed as much to adaptations to ecological need (e.g. dependence
on stored food –e.g. see Grodzinsky and Clayton, 2010; Shettleworth,
2012) as to differences in phylogeny, brain structure or brain size.
Consequently, the argument that smaller and smaller-brained species
are necessarily less cognitively sophisticated, and hence less likely to
require conscious processing, is undermined. Behavioural ecological
needs may better predict variation in these capacities across species,
and any associated capacities for affective consciousness.
The theories of consciousness reviewed here (Section 4), and the
neural and functional correlates of consciousness, affective conscious-
ness and emotion (described in Sections 5 and 6) have largely, though
not exclusively, focused on cortical involvement, and interactions be-
tween cortical and subcortical (amygdala, thalamus) regions in hu-
mans. As a consequence, animals that share homologues of human
structures such as the PFC, insula, ACC and parietal cortex are im-
portant candidates for future comparative research into structural and
functional correlates of potential correlates in animals. But con-
temporary approaches in the study of comparative cognition outlined
above point to the value of investigating potential correlates of affect
and consciousness across a wider range of species. Evolutionary the-
ories posit both generalised cognitive capacities across a wide range of
animals (e.g. habituation, simple associative learning), coupled with
specialised cognitive skills advantageous within particular ecological or
behavioural niches (e.g. spatial memory; episodic future thinking;
Pearce, 2008; Shettleworth, 2012). If parallel processes apply to the
evolution of consciousness, we are led to consider whether conscious-
ness (and its variants, including conscious affect) is the product of
specialization or generalization. That is, is it likely to be a process that
facilitates a widespread function (e.g. decision-making) across many
phyla and species, through phylogenetically preserved neural struc-
tures? Or is it more specialised process, useful in only a limited range of
behavioural niches? If the latter, parallel evolution of conscious pro-
cessing may be found in some distantly related species that share de-
cision-making challenges.
7. Cognitive and decision-making correlates of affective
consciousness
The functional or information processing correlates of consciousness
approach outlined in Section 4 can also be focused specifically on af-
fective states. An important proposed function of conscious affect is in
guiding decisions and, accordingly, the present section focuses on in-
formation processing functions of conscious affect in the form of deci-
sion-making and choice.
7.1. Decision-making functions of affect in humans
A prominent hypothesis for a function of conscious emotional ex-
perience in humans is that felt emotional experiences act as pieces of
information, to be made use of when judgements or decisions are made
(e.g. Damasio, 1994; Forgas and Bower, 1988; Forgas, 1995; Frijda,
1986; Gasper and Clore, 1998; Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001;
Loewenstein et al., 2001; Pham, 1998; Schwarz and Clore, 1983, 1988,
2003, 1996; Wyer and Carlston, 1979; Zillman, 1978). These ideas bear
close similarities to theories of consciousness such as the global work-
space proposals of Baars and colleagues (e.g. see Baars, 2002; Newman
and Baars, 1993), summarized above. Specifically, both global work-
space and affect-as-information theories suggest that an information
processing advantage is gained by using conscious representations to
bring together the disparate neural systems involved in different facets
of cognition and emotion (see also Morsella, 2005).
The core psychological idea of affect-as-information theories is that
referring to one’s immediate, felt, emotional state can act as a quick,
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heuristic processing method for making judgements, particularly in the
case of complex, urgent, ambiguous or uncertain decisions. Affective
states that have not been assigned to a specific cause or origin (i.e. free-
floating feelings or moods that the experiencer has not consciously at-
tributed to a particular cause or attached to an object) are the most
likely to be used to influence judgements in affectively congruent ways.
In their seminal study, Schwarz and Clore (1983) telephoned hundreds
of participants about their general satisfaction with life; participants
were more likely to report that this was high when the weather was
sunny. However, if the pleasant weather was brought to their attention,
satisfaction ratings were no longer elevated (but see also a recent de-
bate about the size, boundary conditions and robustness of this effect –
Schwarz, 2017; Yap et al., 2017).
Similar ideas have been applied to the fields of neuroeconomics and
decision-making under risk. For example, in his risk-as-feelings hy-
pothesis, Loewenstein argued that people make use of emotional feel-
ings to calculate the value and probability of the potential outcomes of
risky gambles and other economic decisions (Loewenstein et al., 2001,
2008; cf. Slovic and Peters, 2006). Sometimes these feelings may re-
present ongoing moods, while on other occasions, they may reflect
moment by moment changes in core affect, with, for example, wins and
losses in a gambling game influencing subsequent decisions (e.g. Croson
and Sundali, 2005). And in the field of clinical neuroscience, Damasio
(1994) proposed that people attend to their peripheral, somatic (in-
cluding autonomic and enteric) responses to emotive or risky situations
in order to make decisions about the best course of action. Evidence for
this comes from individuals with orbitofrontal damage, who often make
disadvantageous decisions, perhaps because of an inability to generate
somatic markers pertaining to decision outcomes that may be pun-
ishing, such as the loss of money (e.g. Bechara et al., 1997, 2000).
Here we should note that whether or not such processes are ex-
clusively dependent on consciously experienced emotions is not yet
certain. Proponents of the somatic marker hypothesis claim that an-
ticipatory somatic responses could be used both consciously and un-
consciously (i.e. explicitly and implicitly) to guide decisions (e.g.
Bechara et al., 2005). And it has not yet been conclusively demon-
strated that all such decisions are necessarily reliant on consciously
experienced affective information. Indeed, Winkielman et al. (2005)
showed that some decisions appear to be influenced by affective reac-
tions that people do not consciously report. They induced ‘unconscious’
emotional states in human participants by showing them subliminal
images of smiling and frowning faces (see Mogg et al., 1993;
Niedenthal, 1990; Zajonc, 2000). Thirsty participants who were ex-
posed to happy as opposed to angry faces, poured and drank more of a
novel sweet drink, and reported that they were willing to pay sig-
nificantly more money for it. Winkielman and colleagues concluded
that this was an example of unconscious emotion – an affective re-
sponse powerful enough to influence preference/liking related beha-
viour, but not registered consciously by participants as an actual felt
state. Winkielman and Gogolushko (2018) found similar results with
both submiminal and supraliminal facial expression primes, though not
with emotive words presented subliminally and supraliminally (which
produced incongruent effects). Although there is significant support for
the notion that consciously experienced affective states guide human
decision-making, we should thus be aware that such effects may also
proceed via routes that do not require conscious experience of emotion.
7.2. Implications for animals
The idea that affective processes play a key role in decision-making
opens up possibilities for studying choice behaviour as a potential
marker of animal affect and even conscious emotion – a NCAC. Here we
briefly consider decision-making scenarios where a role of affect has
been proposed in animals: simple trade-off choices between different
types of resource; affective influences in reinforcement learning; and
affective influences on decision-making under ambiguity.
A number of researchers have considered the possibility that affect
may be involved in adaptive decision-making in animals, especially
where disparate motivations are pitted against one another. The focus
of these proposals is on prospective and anticipated affect and its role in
risky and value-based judgements. Cabanac (1992) argued that animals
make choices between different sorts of resource (e.g. food, water,
sweet taste, temperature) in an additive way that can be accounted for
by the existence of some form of ‘common currency’ with which to
weigh up the relative rewards expected from each resource. He pro-
posed that the consciously experienced affective state of pleasure fulfils
this role, and functions to arbitrate in behavioural decisions that re-
quire the comparison of different sorts of reward or punisher. Niel and
Weary (2007) investigated similar trade-offs in rats to establish the
relative aversiveness of different types of gases used for euthanasia (e.g.
CO2), with subjects being required to choose between consuming highly
palatable food rewards and spending time in a gas-perfused chamber
(see also Cooper et al., 1998). Studying a very different species, Elwood
and Appel (2009) investigated trade-off decisions between reward and
punishment in hermit crabs. These animals show strong preferences for
moving to larger discarded mollusc shells in which they live. But when
a large shell also delivers electric shocks over a certain voltage, they
prefer to move to a smaller one. There are of course many other ex-
amples of trade-off decisions that animals face daily. It is possible that
optimal decisions in such situations require conscious experience of
emotion but equally that non-conscious affective processes are at play.
A step towards resolving these alternatives is to develop experiments in
humans that confirm or refute the hypothesised link between conscious
affective experience and the capacity to engage in these sorts of trade-
off decisions.
Another area of conjecture regarding the functions of conscious
affect in animals concerns the possibility that it has one or more roles in
reinforcement learning. From the earliest days of experimental animal
psychology, it was realised that affect (in the human sense of pleasure
and displeasure) bears close parallels with behavioural reinforcement
and punishment (Thorndike, 2011). However, it is of course possible
that any affective processes involved are non-conscious (e.g. Damasio,
1999; LeDoux, 1996). For example, Berridge and colleagues (e.g.
Berridge, 2000; Berridge et al., 2009; Berridge and Winkielman, 2003)
have proposed that the sub-cortical brain network that gives rise to
‘core liking’ reactions in rodents to stimuli such as sweet tastes (i.e.
behavioural responses such as lip-licking) needs to interact with cortical
brain systems if the conscious registration of such states is to occur.
Species that do not have this capacity may perform affective or hedonic
behaviours, and learn as a result of reinforcement, but not actually
experience affective feelings akin to human liking or disliking. Birds,
reptiles, decerebrate mammals, and even invertebrates such as aplysia
have been found to show reinforcement learning (Bromily, 1948;
Burghardt, 2013; Emery and Clayton, 2004; Norman et al., 1977;
Walters et al., 1981). So a cerebral cortex is certainly not necessary for
reinforcers to affect behaviour. And compelling evidence for non-con-
scious reinforcement comes from numerous studies of learning under
anaesthesia. Such learning, including food aversion learning and tone-
shock associations, has been demonstrated in adult rats (Roll and Smith,
1972; Rabin and Rabin, 1984; Bermudez-Rattoni et al., 1988; Edeline
and Neuenschwander-El Massioui, 1988), foetal rats (Mickley et al.,
1995), mice (Pang et al., 1996) and sheep (Provenza et al., 1994).
Despite these findings, the possibility remains that some forms of
reinforcement- learning, such as goal-directed learning, do indeed re-
quire consciously experienced affect to occur. Rats can show both a
simple form of learning of the association between a cue and the value
of a reinforcer (habit or ‘model-free’ learning), and a more complex
form of association between a cue and both the value and identity of the
reinforcer (i.e. water or food; goal directed or ‘model-based’ learning)
(Dayan and Berridge, 2014). It has been suggested that the conscious-
ness of affect may be needed to bring together these two types of in-
formation (affective - the value of the reinforcer; cognitive - the identity
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of the reinforcer), in order to produce successful goal-directed learning
(Dickinson and Balleine, 2009). Although computationally more de-
manding, these types of association confer information processing ad-
vantages, allowing animals the flexibility to change and redirect in-
strumental behaviours according to current needs (e.g. current hunger
vs current thirst). But many questions still remain about goal directed
learning, including which species can make use of it, and whether, in
humans, any conscious affect can be shown to be required for such
associations to be formed. More generally, clear evidence that re-
inforcement learning in humans requires rewards and punishers to be
experienced as conscious feeling states (i.e. of positively or negatively
valenced affect) would help shed further light on the potential utility of
inferring conscious animal affect from reinforcement learning.
Paralleling the affect-as-information hypotheses described above, it
has been speculated that some animals may also use affective states to
aid adaptive judgement and decision-making when there is uncertainty
about decision outcomes. Using tests of decision-making under ambi-
guity or ‘judgement bias’ (Paul et al., 2005; Mendl et al., 2009a,b,
2010), many studies have demonstrated information processing biases
in a wide range of species in response to affect manipulations (e.g. rats -
Harding et al., 2004; dogs – Mendl et al., 2010; starlings - Bateson and
Matheson, 2007; Ravens - Adriaense et al., 2019; Honeybees – Bateson
et al., 2011). In line with findings from humans, subjects assumed to be
in an induced positive affective state tend to respond to ambiguous
stimuli as if they predict reward, while those in a more negative af-
fective state behave as if they predict a punisher (although there are
also some null and opposite findings – e.g. Muller et al., 2012; Ross
et al., 2019). Whether the same conscious affective processes determine
such ‘optimistic’ or ‘pessimistic’ biases in human and non-human ani-
mals remains to be established. For example, the finding that even some
invertebrate species show judgement biases raises questions as to
whether the phenomenon observed in animals involves any conscious
component of affect. It may be that in some species valenced affective
states, embodied in neural activity, drive changes in decision-making in
the absence of any conscious experience, whilst in others a conscious
component is involved as appears to be the case in humans (Mendl
et al., 2011; Mendl and Paul, 2016).
8. Conclusions
The study of affective consciousness in animals falls squarely at the
intersection of two longstanding controversies in psychological science
– the relationship between consciousness and emotion and the mea-
surement of nonhuman, and nonverbal, consciousness. Accordingly, the
strands of empirical evidence and theoretical argument reviewed here
are both richly diverse and hotly contested. But though it is beset by the
twin enigmas of conceptualizing emotion and measuring consciousness,
the study of animal affective consciousness is nonetheless of major
potential importance, both for practical problems in animal welfare and
for our efforts to get a clear view of our evolutionary kin, near and
distant. We have adopted a componential view of emotions (reviewed
in Section 3), in which conscious feelings constitute one component in a
complex syndrome of related cognitive, motivational, expressive, and
behavioural processes. And we have especially highlighted the im-
plications of NCAC theories for a scientific understanding of how con-
scious feelings can, and cannot, empirically dissociate from other
components of emotion, both within and across species.
In posing questions about conscious affect in animals, much (though
not all1) work starts with the human case, where understanding is fa-
cilitated by subjects’ emotional reports (as well as the informal in-
trospection the researcher employs in interpreting such reports). The
human models are then used to identify candidate criteria for conscious
emotion, which can be applied to observations of brain, behaviour, and
physiology in different animal species. Research in this program can, in
turn, be roughly divided into two classes – a wide-focus approach, which
begins with general models of human consciousness (Section 4), and a
narrow-focus approach, which sets out from specific models of human
emotion (Section 5). The two approaches inform one another, because
emotional consciousness is one form of consciousness, and together
they can suggest principles for the identification of conscious affect in
the absence of subjective report (Sections 6 and 7).
As our review illustrates, wide- and narrow-focus studies alike
present a mixed picture of promising developments and enduring
controversy. In our view, an especially promising strategy is to ex-
plicitly link proposed neurofunctional analyses of consciousness in
general with a componential view of emotion in particular. This
strategy is generative, suggesting novel potential resolutions to ques-
tions about conscious animal affect. Nonetheless, the stubborn persis-
tence of core controversies (what kinds of cognition does consciousness
require, and what kinds of emotional response require consciousness?)
bars anything like a consensus choice among the candidate resolutions
at present.
As an example of this dynamic, consider Fig. 1 and its depiction of
the componential view of emotion. Here, five components of emotion
(Scherer, 2005a,b) are conceptually distinguished, and the task for
emotion researchers is to explain their empirical coordination in emo-
tional responses. Such explanations may refer to hypothesized “co-
ordinating mechanisms” that coherently control the component me-
chanisms (the solid lines in Fig. 1) and/or to direct links between the
component mechanisms themselves (dashed lines). It is important to
emphasize, however, that Fig. 1 does not, on its own, constitute a model
of emotion. Rather, it supplies a conceptual framework within which
empirical questions about emotion can be posed – questions which an
adequate model, drawing on both wide- and narrow-focus empirical
approaches, must answer. Most importantly: (1) how is the coordina-
tion of the different components of an emotional response achieved?
And (2) do the various components – including emotional conscious-
ness – play comparable or unequal roles in the process of cross-com-
ponent coordination?
Different models of emotion, drawing on different views of the
functional role(s) of consciousness, suggest different answers to these
two critical questions. As an illustration, Fig. 2 shows how one model of
conscious emotion, derived from a subset of the research reviewed here,
would resolve these questions. In this model, a GW perspective on af-
fective consciousness is assumed. That is, consciousness – affective and
otherwise – is assumed to be linked to thalamocortical broadcasting of
selected information for the flexible coordination of cognition and ac-
tion. If consciousness is inherently linked to this coordination function,
it will presumably be essential for some aspects of the coordination of
component processes in human emotion. Returning to Fig. 1, this GW-
inspired viewpoint would then suggest that the “coordinating me-
chanisms” are not neatly separable from the “consciousness” compo-
nent. Rather, the consciousness component constitutes part of the co-
ordinating mechanisms (though further unconscious mechanisms,
specific to emotion, may also play a role in coordinating an emotional
response). Fig. 2 shows how this neurofunctional model of conscious
emotion unpacks and relates the “flat” uninterpreted relations in Fig. 1.
In this way, the model offers one possible answer to the critical ques-
tions of how the emotion components relate to the coordinating process
and to one another (consciousness, unlike the other components, is part
of a posited central coordinating mechanism). It suggests, in turn, cri-
teria for affective consciousness in the absence of subjective report (i.e.
does the affective response reflect a level of integration and flexibility
that requires the operation of the GW?).2
1 For an instructive recent debate on the strengths and drawbacks of theories
of emotion primarily derived from human versus animal studies, see Panskepp
et al. (Panksepp et al., 2017). 2 Importantly, note that on this view, this question goes beyond the simple
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The model in Fig. 2 illustrates how a neurofunctional analysis of
consciousness can flesh out the componential framework for emotion,
implying conditions under which consciousness can(not) dissociate
from the other emotion components, and hence providing principled
criteria whereby consciousness can be inferred from observation of the
other components. To be sure, the neurofunctional analysis of conscious
emotion (a GW view) assumed in Fig. 2 is not the only available one,
and it is not definitively established by the evidence reviewed here.
Alternative (e.g., HOT) neurofunctional analyses may assign the con-
sciousness component in Fig. 1 a more peripheral functional role, im-
plying readier dissociability from other components, and hence re-
quiring more stringent criteria for the identification of conscious
feelings. At the other end of the spectrum, some views associate basic
forms of consciousness (or sentience) with more elementary nervous
system functions, implying that consciousness accompanies even com-
ponent-responses with minimal complexity or coordination.
Nonetheless, the example illustrates the logic of leading approaches
to the study of conscious emotion, highlighting both their promise and
their limitations. On the one hand, developing theories of the NCAC
suggest substantive interpretations of the componential framework,
from which principled criteria for affective consciousness in nonverbal
creatures can be derived. On the other hand, the search for NCACs itself
remains closely bound up with longstanding controversies in the con-
ceptualization of both consciousness and emotion. It is inseparable from
fundamental questions, still not adequately resolved, about when, how,
and why conscious experiences can be inferred from behavioural re-
sponses when subjective report is unavailable. The merging of a com-
ponential view of emotion with a neurofunctional analysis of con-
sciousness thus opens up promising new paths toward a scientific
understanding of animal affective consciousness, but also shines a so-
bering light on the obstacles that lie in their way.
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